11.

The scope and level of the suspension of commitments or payments to be imposed on the basis of paragraph 10, shall be proportionate, respect the equality of treatment between Member States and take into account the economic and social circumstances of the Member State concerned, in particular the level of unemployment of the Member State concerned in relation to the Union average and the impact of the suspension on the economy of the Member State concerned. The impact of suspensions on programmes of critical importance to address adverse economic or social conditions shall be a specific factor to be taken into account. Detailed provisions for determining the scope and level of suspensions are set out in Annex III. The suspension of commitments shall be subject to the lower of the following ceilings: A maximum of 50 % of the commitments relating to the next financial year for the ESI Funds in the first case of non-compliance with an excessive deficit procedure as referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9 and a maximum 25 % of the commitments relating to the next financial year for the ESI Funds in the first case of non-compliance relating to a corrective action plan under an excessive imbalances procedure as referred to in point (b) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9 or non-compliance with the recommended corrective action pursuant to an excessive imbalances procedure as referred to in point (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9. The level of the suspension shall increase gradually up to a maximum of 100 % of the commitments relating to the next financial year for the ESI Funds in the case of an excessive deficit procedure and up to 50 % of the commitments relating to the next financial year for the ESI Funds in the case of an excessive imbalance procedure, in line with the seriousness of the non-compliance; a maximum of 0,5 % of nominal GDP applying in the first case of non-compliance with an excessive deficit procedure as referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9 and a maximum of 0,25 % of nominal GDP applying in the first case of non-compliance relating to a corrective action plan under an excessive imbalances procedure as referred to in point (b) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9 or non-compliance with recommended corrective action under an excessive imbalances procedure as referred to in point (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9. If non-compliance relating to corrective actions referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9 persists, the percentage of that GDP cap shall be gradually increased up to: a maximum of 1 % of nominal GDP applying in the event of persistent non-compliance with an excessive deficit procedure in accordance with point (a) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9; and a maximum of 0,5 % of nominal GDP applying in the event of persistent non-compliance with an excessive imbalance procedure in accordance with point (b) or (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9, in line with the seriousness of the non-compliance; a maximum of 50 % of the commitments relating to the next financial year for the ESI Funds or a maximum of 0,5 % of nominal GDP in the first case of non-compliance as referred to in points (d) and (e) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9. In determining the level of the suspension and whether to suspend commitments or payments, the stage of the programme cycle shall be taken into account having regard in particular to the period remaining for using the funds following the re-budgeting of suspended commitments.

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Source: EUR-Lex (Cellar) · retrieved 2026-10-29 · Text as adopted (Official Journal); later amendments are not incorporated in this text.