TITLE 2

Each TSO shall perform coordinated operational security analyses for at least the following time-frames: year-ahead; week-ahead, when applicable in accordance with Article 69; day-ahead; and intraday. When performing a coordinated operational security analysis, the TSO shall apply the methodology adopted pursuant to Article 75. To perform operational security analyses, each TSO shall, in the N-Situation, simulate each contingency from its contingency list established in accordance with Article 33 and verify that, in the (N-1)-situation, the operational security limits defined in accordance with Article 25 are not exceeded in its control area. Each TSO shall perform its operational security analyses using at least the common grid models established in accordance with Articles 67, 68, 70 and, where applicable, 69 and shall take into account the planned outages when carrying out those analyses. Each TSO shall share the results of its operational security analysis with at least the TSOs whose elements are included in the TSO's observability area and are affected according to that operational security analysis, in order to allow those TSOs to verify that operational security limits are respected within their control areas. Each TSO shall perform year-ahead and, where applicable, week-ahead operational security analyses in order to detect at least the following constraints: power flows and voltages exceeding operational security limits; violations of stability limits of the transmission system identified in accordance with Article 38(2) and (6); and violations of short-circuit thresholds of the transmission system. When a TSO detects a possible constraint, it shall design remedial actions in accordance with Articles 20 to 23. If remedial actions without costs are not available and the constraint is linked to the planned unavailability of some relevant assets, the constraint shall constitute an outage planning incompatibility and the TSO shall initiate outage coordination in accordance with Article 95 or 100 depending of the time of the year when this action is initiated. Each TSO shall perform day-ahead, intraday and close to real-time operational security analyses to detect possible constraints and prepare and activate the remedial actions with any other concerned TSOs and, if applicable, affected DSOs or SGUs. Each TSO shall monitor load and generation forecasts. When those forecasts indicate a significant deviation in load or generation, the TSO shall update its operational security analysis. When performing close to real-time operational security analysis in its observability area, each TSO shall use state estimation. By 12 months after entry into force of this Regulation, all TSOs shall jointly develop a proposal for a methodology for coordinating operational security analysis. That methodology shall aim at the standardisation of operational security analysis at least per synchronous area and shall include at least: methods for assessing the influence of transmission system elements and SGUs located outside of a TSO's control area in order to identify those elements included in the TSO's observability area and the contingency influence thresholds above which contingencies of those elements constitute external contingencies; principles for common risk assessment, covering at least, for the contingencies referred to in Article 33: associated probability; transitory admissible overloads; and impact of contingencies; principles for assessing and dealing with uncertainties of generation and load, taking into account a reliability margin in line with Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222; requirements on coordination and information exchange between regional security coordinators in relation to the tasks listed in Article 77(3); role of ENTSO for Electricity in the governance of common tools, data quality rules improvement, monitoring of the methodology for coordinated operational security analysis and of the common provisions for regional operational security coordination in each capacity calculation region. The methods referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1 shall allow the identification of all elements of a TSO's observability area, being grid elements of other TSOs or transmission-connected DSOs, power generating modules or demand facilities. Those methods shall take into account the following transmission system elements and SGUs' characteristics: connectivity status or electrical values (such as voltages, power flows, rotor angle) which significantly influence the accuracy of the results of the state estimation for the TSO's control area, above common thresholds; connectivity status or electrical values (such as voltages, power flows, rotor angle) which significantly influence the accuracy of the results of the TSO's operational security analysis, above common thresholds; and requirement to ensure an adequate representation of the connected elements in the TSO's observability area. The values referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 shall be determined through situations representative of the various conditions which can be expected, characterised by variables such as generation level and pattern, level of electricity exchanges across the borders and asset outages. The methods referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1 shall allow the identification of all elements of a TSO's external contingency list with the following characteristics: each element has an influence factor on electrical values, such as voltages, power flows, rotor angle, in the TSO's control area greater than common contingency influence thresholds, meaning that the outage of this element can significantly influence the results of the TSO's contingency analysis; the choice of the contingency influence thresholds shall minimize the risk that the occurrence of a contingency identified in another TSO's control area and not in the TSO's external contingency list could lead to a TSO's system behaviour deemed not acceptable for any element of its internal contingency list, such as an emergency state; the assessment of such a risk shall be based on situations representative of the various conditions which can be expected, characterised by variables such as generation level and pattern, exchange levels, asset outages. The principles for common risk assessment referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1 shall set out criteria for the assessment of interconnected system security. Those criteria shall be established with reference to a harmonised level of maximum accepted risk between the different TSO's security analysis. Those principles shall refer to: the consistency in the definition of exceptional contingencies; the evaluation of the probability and impact of exceptional contingencies; and the consideration of exceptional contingencies in a TSO's contingency list when their probability exceeds a common threshold. The principles for assessing and dealing with uncertainties referred to in point (c) of paragraph 1 shall provide for keeping the impact of the uncertainties regarding generation or demand below an acceptable and harmonised maximum level for each TSO's operational security analysis. Those principles shall set out: harmonised conditions where one TSO shall update its operational security analysis. The conditions shall take into account relevant aspects such as the time horizon of the generation and demand forecasts, the level of change of forecasted values within the TSO's control area or within the control area of other TSOs, location of generation and demand, the previous results of its operational security analysis; and minimum frequency of generation and demand forecast updates, depending on their variability and the installed capacity of non-dispatchable generation. By 3 months after the approval of the methodology for coordinating operational security analysis in Article 75(1), all TSOs of each capacity calculation region shall jointly develop a proposal for common provisions for regional operational security coordination, to be applied by the regional security coordinators and the TSOs of the capacity calculation region. The proposal shall respect the methodologies for coordinating operational security analysis developed in accordance with Article 75(1) and complement where necessary the methodologies developed in accordance with Articles 35 and 74 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222. The proposal shall determine: conditions and frequency of intraday coordination of operational security analysis and updates to the common grid model by the regional security coordinator; the methodology for the preparation of remedial actions managed in a coordinated way, considering their cross-border relevance as determined in accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222, taking into account the requirements in Articles 20 to 23 and determining at least: the procedure for exchanging the information of the available remedial actions, between relevant TSOs and the regional security coordinator; the classification of constraints and the remedial actions in accordance with Article 22; the identification of the most effective and economically efficient remedial actions in case of operational security violations referred to in Article 22; the preparation and activation of remedial actions in accordance with Article 23(2); the sharing of the costs of remedial actions referred to in Article 22, complementing where necessary the common methodology developed in accordance with Article 74 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222. As a general principle, costs of non-cross-border relevant congestions shall be borne by the TSO responsible for the given control area and costs of relieving cross-border-relevant congestions shall be covered by TSOs responsible for the control areas in proportion to the aggravating impact of energy exchange between given control areas on the congested grid element. In determining whether congestion have cross-border relevance, the TSOs shall take into account the congestion that would appear in the absence of energy exchanges between control areas. The proposal of all TSOs of a capacity calculation region for common provisions for regional operational security coordination pursuant to Article 76(1) shall also include common provisions concerning the organisation of regional operational security coordination, including at least: the appointment of the regional security coordinator(s) that will perform the tasks in paragraph 3 for that capacity calculation region; rules concerning the governance and operation of regional security coordinator(s), ensuring equitable treatment of all member TSOs; where the TSOs propose to appoint more than one regional security coordinator in accordance with subparagraph (a): a proposal for a coherent allocation of the tasks between the regional security coordinators who will be active in that capacity calculation region. The proposal shall take full account of the need to coordinate the different tasks allocated to the regional security coordinators; an assessment demonstrating that the proposed setup of regional security coordinators and allocation of tasks is efficient, effective and consistent with the regional coordinated capacity calculation established pursuant to Articles 20 and 21 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222; an effective coordination and decision making process to resolve conflicting positions between regional security coordinators within the capacity calculation region. When developing the proposal for common provisions concerning the organisation of regional operational security coordination in paragraph 1, the following requirements shall be met: each TSO shall be covered by at least one regional security coordinator; all TSOs shall ensure that the total number of regional security coordinators across the Union is not higher than six. The TSOs of each capacity calculation region shall propose the delegation of the following tasks in accordance with paragraph 1: regional operational security coordination in accordance with Article 78 in order to support TSOs fulfil their obligations for the year-ahead, day-ahead and intraday time-frames in Article 34(3) and Articles 72 and 74; building of common grid model in accordance with Article 79; regional outage coordination in accordance with Article 80, in order to support TSOs fulfil their obligations in Articles 98 and 100; regional adequacy assessment in accordance with Article 81 in order to support TSOs fulfil their obligations under Article 107. In executing its tasks, a regional security coordinator shall take account of data covering at least all capacity calculation regions for which it has been allocated tasks, including the observability areas of all TSOs in those capacity calculation regions.. All regional security coordinators shall coordinate the execution of their tasks in order to facilitate the fulfilment of the objectives of this Regulation. All regional security coordinators shall ensure the harmonization of processes and, where duplication is not justified by reasons of efficiency or by the need to ensure continuity of service, the creation of joint tools to ensure efficient cooperation and coordination between the regional security coordinators. Each TSO shall provide the regional security coordinator with all the information and data required to perform the coordinated regional operational security assessment, including at least: the updated contingency list, established according to the criteria defined in the methodology for coordinating operational security analysis adopted in accordance with Article 75(1); the updated list of possible remedial actions, among the categories listed in Article 22, and their anticipated costs provided in accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 if a remedial action includes redispatching or countertrading, aimed at contributing to relieve any constraint identified in the region; and the operational security limits established in accordance with Article 25. Each regional security coordinator shall: perform the coordinated regional operational security assessment in accordance with Article 76 on the basis of the common grid models established in accordance with Article 79, the contingency list and the operational security limits provided by each TSOs in paragraph 1. It shall deliver the results of the coordinated regional operational security assessment at least to all TSOs of the capacity calculation region. Where it detects a constraint, it shall recommend to the relevant TSOs the most effective and economically efficient remedial actions and may also recommend remedial actions other than those provided by the TSOs. This recommendation for remedial actions shall be accompanied by explanations as to its rationale; coordinate the preparation of remedial actions with and among TSOs in accordance with Article 76(1)(b), to enable TSOs achieve a coordinated activation of remedial actions in real-time. When performing the coordinated regional operational security assessment and identifying the appropriate remedial actions, each regional security coordinator shall coordinate with other regional security coordinators. When a TSO receives from the relevant regional security coordinator the results of the coordinated regional operational security assessment with a proposal for a remedial action, it shall evaluate the recommended remedial action for the elements involved in that remedial action and located in its control area. In so doing, it shall apply the provisions of Article 20. The TSO shall decide whether to implement the recommended remedial action. Where it decides not to implement the recommended remedial action, it shall provide an explanation for this decision to the RSC. Where the TSO decides to implement the recommended remedial action, it shall apply this action for the elements located in its control area provided that it is compatible with real-time conditions. Each regional security coordinator shall check the quality of the individual grid models in order to contribute to building the common grid model for each mentioned time-frame in accordance with the methodologies referred to in Articles 67(1) and 70(1). Each TSO shall make available to its regional security coordinator the individual grid model necessary to build the common grid model for each time-frame through the ENTSO for Electricity operational planning data environment. Where necessary, each regional security coordinator shall request the TSOs concerned to correct their individual grid models in order to achieve their conformity with the quality controls and for their improvement. Each TSO shall correct its individual grid models, after verifying the need for correction if applicable, on the basis of the requests of the regional security coordinator or another TSO. In accordance with the methodologies referred to in Articles 67(1) and 70(1), and in accordance with Article 28 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222, a regional security coordinator shall be appointed by all TSOs to build the common grid model for each time-frame and store it on the ENTSO for Electricity operational planning data environment. The outage coordination regions within which the TSOs shall proceed to outage coordination shall be at least equal to the capacity calculation regions. The TSOs of two or more outage coordination regions can agree to merge them into one unique outage coordination region. In that case they shall identify the regional security coordinator performing the tasks referred to in Article 77(3). Each TSO shall provide the regional security coordinator with the information necessary to detect and solve regional outage planning incompatibilities, including at least: the availability plans of its internal relevant assets, stored on the ENTSO for Electricity operational planning data environment; the most recent availability plans for all non-relevant assets of its control area which are: capable of influencing the results of the outage planning incompatibility analysis; modelled in the individual grid models which are used for the outage incompatibility assessment; scenarios on which the outage planning incompatibilities have to be investigated and used to build the corresponding common grid models derived from the common grid models for different time-frames established in accordance with Articles 67 and 79. Each regional security coordinator shall perform regional operational security analyses on the basis of the information provided by the relevant TSOs in order to detect any outage planning incompatibility. It shall provide all TSOs of the outage coordination region with a list of detected outage planning incompatibilities and the solutions it proposes to solve those outage planning incompatibilities. In performing their obligations under paragraph 4, each regional security coordinator shall coordinate its analyses with other regional security coordinators. In performing their obligations in accordance with Article 98(3) and Article 100(4)(b), all TSOs shall take into account the results of the assessment provided by the regional security coordinator in accordance with paragraph 3 and paragraph 4. Each regional security coordinator shall perform regional adequacy assessments for at least the week-ahead time-frame. Each TSO shall provide the regional security coordinator with the information necessary to perform the regional adequacy assessments referred to in paragraph 1, including: the expected total load and available resources of demand response; the availability of power generation modules; and the operational security limits. Each regional security coordinator shall perform adequacy assessments on the basis of the information provided by the relevant TSOs with the aim of detecting situations where a lack of adequacy is expected in any of the control areas or at regional level, taking into account possible cross-border exchanges and operational security limits. It shall deliver the results together with the actions it proposes to reduce risks to the TSOs of the capacity calculation region. Those actions shall include proposals for remedial actions that allow the increase of cross-border exchanges. When performing a regional adequacy assessment, each regional security coordinator shall coordinate with other regional security coordinators.

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Source: EUR-Lex (Cellar) · retrieved 2026-11-04 · Text as adopted (Official Journal); later amendments are not incorporated in this text.