art_1__point_24__point_c__text_2

‘2. By 18 June 2020, and every 12 months thereafter until the final extension referred to in the third subparagraph, the Commission shall prepare a report assessing whether viable technical solutions have been developed for the transfer by pension scheme arrangements of cash and non-cash collateral as variation margins and the need for any measures to facilitate those viable technical solutions. ESMA shall, by 18 December 2019, and every 12 months thereafter until the final extension referred to in the third subparagraph, in cooperation with EIOPA, EBA and the ESRB, submit a report to the Commission, assessing the following: (a) whether CCPs, clearing members and pension scheme arrangements have undertaken an appropriate effort and have developed viable technical solutions facilitating the participation of such arrangements in central clearing by posting cash and non-cash collateral as variation margins, including the implications of those solutions on market liquidity and procyclicality and their potential legal or other implications; (b) the volume and the nature of the activity of pension scheme arrangements in cleared and non-cleared OTC derivatives markets, within each asset class, and any related systemic risk to the financial system; (c) the consequences of pension scheme arrangements fulfilling the clearing requirement on their investment strategies, including any shift in their cash and non-cash asset allocation; (d) the implications of the clearing thresholds specified pursuant to point (b) of Article 10(4) for pension scheme arrangements; (e) the impact of other legal requirements on the cost differentials between cleared and non-cleared OTC derivative contracts, including margin requirements for non-cleared derivatives and the calculation of the leverage ratio in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (f) whether any further measures are necessary to facilitate a clearing solution for pension scheme arrangements. The Commission may adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 82 to extend the two-year period referred to in Article 89(1) twice, each time by one year, where it concludes that no viable technical solution has been developed and that the adverse effect of centrally clearing derivative contracts on the retirement benefits of future pensioners remains unchanged. CCPs, clearing members and pension scheme arrangements shall make their best efforts to contribute to the development of viable technical solutions that facilitate the clearing of OTC derivative contracts by such arrangements. The Commission shall set up an expert group composed of representatives of CCPs, clearing members, pension scheme arrangements and other relevant parties to such viable technical solutions to monitor their efforts and assess the progress made in the development of viable technical solutions that facilitate the clearing of OTC derivative contracts by pension scheme arrangements, including the transfer by such arrangements of cash and non-cash collateral as variation margins. That expert group shall meet at least every six months. The Commission shall consider the efforts made by CCPs, clearing members and pension scheme arrangements when drafting its report pursuant to the first subparagraph. 3. By 18 December 2020 the Commission shall prepare a report assessing: (a) whether the obligations to report transactions under Article 26 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and under this Regulation create a duplicative transaction reporting obligation for non-OTC derivatives and whether reporting of non-OTC transactions could be reduced or simplified for all counterparties without undue loss of information; (b) the necessity and appropriateness of aligning the trading obligation for derivatives under Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 with changes made under Regulation (EU) 2019/834 to the clearing obligation for derivatives, in particular to the scope of the entities that are subject to the clearing obligation; (c) whether any trades that directly result from post-trade risk reduction services, including portfolio compression, should be exempted from the clearing obligation referred to in Article 4(1), taking into account the extent to which those services mitigate risk, in particular counterparty credit risk and operational risk, the potential for circumvention of the clearing obligation and the potential disincentive to central clearing. The Commission shall submit the report referred to in the first subparagraph to the European Parliament and to the Council, together with any appropriate proposals.’;

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Source: EUR-Lex (Cellar) · retrieved 2026-10-13 · Text as adopted (Official Journal); later amendments are not incorporated in this text.