SECTION C

When assessing the resolvability of a CCP, the resolution authority shall consider the following: the extent to which the CCP is able to map core business lines and critical operations to legal persons; the extent to which legal and corporate structures are aligned with core business lines and critical operations; the extent to which the legal structure of the CCP inhibits the application of the resolution tools as a result of the number of legal persons, the complexity of the group structure or the difficulty in aligning business lines to group entities; the extent to which there are arrangements in place to provide for essential staff, infrastructure, funding, liquidity and capital to support and maintain the core business lines and the critical operations; the existence and robustness of service level agreements; the extent to which the service agreements that the CCP maintains are fully enforceable in the event of resolution of the CCP; the extent to which the governance structure of the CCP is adequate for managing and ensuring compliance with the CCP’s internal policies with respect to its service level agreements; the extent to which the CCP has a process for transitioning the services provided under service level agreements to third parties in the event of the separation of critical functions or of core business lines; the extent to which there are contingency plans and measures in place to ensure continuity in access to payment and settlement systems; the adequacy of the management information systems in ensuring that the resolution authorities are able to gather accurate and complete information regarding the core business lines and critical operations so as to facilitate rapid decision making; the capacity of the management information systems to provide the information essential for the effective resolution of the CCP at all times even under rapidly changing conditions; the extent to which the CCP has tested its management information systems under stress scenarios as defined by the resolution authority; the extent to which the CCP can ensure the continuity of its management information systems both for the affected CCP and the new CCP in the case that the critical operations and core business lines are separated from the rest of the operations and business lines; the extent to which any intra-group guarantees are provided at market conditions and the risk management systems concerning those guarantees are robust, where the CCP benefits from or is exposed to such guarantees; the extent to which any intra-group transactions are performed at market conditions and the risk management systems concerning those transactions practices are robust, where the CCP engages in such transactions; the extent to which the use of any intra-group guarantees or transactions increases contagion across the group; the extent to which the resolution of the CCP could have a negative impact on another part of its group, in particular where such group comprises other FMIs, where applicable; whether third-country authorities have the resolution tools necessary to support resolution actions by Union resolution authorities, and the scope for coordinated action between Union and third-country authorities; the feasibility of applying resolution tools in such a way which meets the resolution objectives, given the tools available and the CCP’s structure; any specific requirements needed to issue new instruments of ownership as referred to in Article 33(1); the arrangements and means through which resolution could be hampered in the cases of CCP that have clearing members or collateral arrangements established in different jurisdictions; the credibility of applying resolution tools in such a way which meets the resolution objectives, given possible impacts on clearing members and, where applicable, their clients, other counterparties and employees and possible actions that third-country authorities may take; the extent to which the impact of the CCP’s resolution on the financial system and on financial market’s confidence can be adequately evaluated; the extent to which the resolution of the CCP could have a significant direct or indirect adverse effect on the financial system, market confidence or the economy; the extent to which contagion to other CCPs or to the financial markets could be contained through the application of the resolution tools and the exercise of the resolution powers; and the extent to which the resolution of the CCP could have a significant effect on the operation of payment and settlement systems.

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Source: EUR-Lex (Cellar) · retrieved 2026-10-12 · Text as adopted (Official Journal); later amendments are not incorporated in this text.