rec_6

(6) The 2008 financial crisis highlighted the lack of adequate tools to preserve the critical functions provided by failing financial institutions. It further demonstrated the absence of frameworks to enable cooperation and coordination amongst authorities, in particular those located in different Member States or jurisdictions, to ensure the taking of swift and decisive action. Without such tools and in the absence of cooperation and coordination frameworks, Member States were compelled to rescue financial institutions using taxpayer money in order to stem contagion and reduce panic. While CCPs were not direct recipients of extraordinary public financial support in the 2008 financial crisis, they were protected from the effects that banks failing to perform their obligations would otherwise have had on them. A recovery and resolution framework for CCPs complements the bank resolution framework adopted under Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190). , and is therefore necessary to prevent reliance on taxpayer money in the event of their disorderly failure. Such a framework should also address the possibility of CCPs entering into resolution for reasons other than the default of one or several of their clearing members.

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Source: EUR-Lex (Cellar) · retrieved 2026-10-12 · Text as adopted (Official Journal); later amendments are not incorporated in this text.