§4.2.11 Consumer lock-in

Consumers may sometimes find themselves limited in their choice, experiencing a loss of quality of products they bought, unfavourable changes in contractual terms and/or paying inflated prices due a provider lock-in. This is facilitated by products or marketing designed to create lock-in, and markets that lack competition or transparency. This is especially true for digital markets with proprietary standards that foster a lack of interoperability. For example, when consumers decide on a mobile phone, they also choose the app store that comes with the operating system. They also start a path-dependent process that strengthens lock-in when they buy other internet of things (IoT) products that are only interoperable with their mobile ecosystem. Once this choice is made, it is difficult for consumers to move between ecosystems without financial loss (apps and other (IoT) hardware), loss of time (restoring personal information, settings etc.) and loss of data. Other examples include purchased digital media, which may become inaccessible once the contract with the trader ends, or car repairs, which the consumer must execute at garages certified by the car producer, because only these have access to the full set of diagnostic data. Consumers may also be locked in to a given (national) version of a given ecosystem, for instance on the basis of the location data provided in the registration of the user’s profile, so that using the same profile in another version of the interface or ecosystem may entail the loss of all data and content acquired in the original version. The UCPD generally reduces the risk of lock-in for consumers with Article 9(d) UCPD by preventing traders from creating barriers to switch or cancel the contract. For assessing whether a practice is aggressive, it stipulates that account must be taken of ‘any onerous or disproportionate non-contractual barriers imposed by the trader where a consumer wishes to exercise rights under the contract, including rights to terminate a contract or to switch to another product or another trader’. This provision has a broad scope of application that can cover various non-contractual barriers. The Court has provided further guidance on a specific lock-in scenario. In the Sony case, the Court examined the practice of selling a computer with pre-installed software (including the operating system) (385). The Court stated that the sale of a computer without the option for the consumer to purchase the same model of computer not equipped with pre-installed software does not in itself constitute an unfair commercial practice within the meaning of Article 5(2) UCPD, unless there are additional circumstances at play that make the practice contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and materially distort or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to the product. In that regard, the Court has already stated that, particularly if correct information is provided to consumers, a combined offer of different products or services can satisfy the requirements of fairness laid down in Directive 2005/29/EC (386). Moreover, the Court confirmed in Sony that the failure to indicate the price of each of those items of pre-installed software in the computer does not constitute a misleading commercial practice within the meaning of Article 5(4)(a) and Article 7 UCPD (387). In addition to EU consumer protection rules, EU competition rules are in place to prevent market imbalances. The possible risks of lock-in for consumers due to the lack of interoperability of IoT devices was part of the motivation for the sector enquiry on the consumer IoT, opened on 16 July 2020 (388). In addition, the Commission’s proposal for a Digital Markets Act aims to address consumer lock-in risks through new obligations for gatekeeper platforms (389). When switching providers, Article 20 GDPR and Article 16(4) of the Digital Content Directive (390) give individuals the right to take with them, respectively, their personal data and any content other than personal data, which was provided or created by the consumer when using the digital content or digital service supplied by the trader, thus limiting the effects of lock-in practices (391). Furthermore, Articles 5(1) (g) and (h), and Articles 6(1) (r) and (s) of the CRD help consumers identify lock-in situations in advance by requiring the trader to inform the consumer before the conclusion of the contract of the functionality, compatibility and interoperability of goods with digital elements, digital content and digital services. Finally, Article 3 of the Geo-blocking Regulation (392) ensures that access to the online interface (including app stores) is provided, regardless of the customer's nationality, place of residence or place of establishment.

← 4.2.10 · All articles · 4.3 →

Source: EUR-Lex (Cellar) · retrieved 2026-09-07