Time limits
According to settled case law, it is compatible with EU law to lay down ‘reasonable’ time-limits for bringing proceedings in the interests of legal certainty (427). Reasonable time-limits are not in themselves liable to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law (428). Short time-limits can be problematic already because of the little time they give to consumers to consider their options, which may often involve a legal assessment, including the need to seek legal advice. So far, the Court has considered the length of time-limits on a case-by-case basis and mainly in conjunction with other circumstances, so that there is no absolute scale as to what time-limits are reasonable and which ones are not. Thus, the Court has considered a two-month time-limit to challenge an arbitration award following its notification to be reasonable (429). In contrast, it (430) considered a 20-day time-limit to object to a payment order as ‘particularly short’, but also took into account the obligation to be represented by a lawyer and the associated fees, which may dissuade consumers from defending themselves. In relation to extrajudicial enforcement of a lien (431), the Court took into account that a sale by auction could be contested within 30 days of the notice of enforcement of the charge and that consumers had a period of three months following the public auction to take steps. Furthermore, interim measures were available to suspend or terminate the enforcement during the substantive assessment. On that basis, the Court concluded that the legislation in question did not make it excessively difficult for consumers to rely on protection under the UCTD. Concerning a transition arrangement for a new right to object to mortgage enforcement based on the unfairness of contract terms (432), the Court (433) held that the four-week period for forming opposition in relation to pending proceedings was, in principle, reasonable and proportionate (434). Nevertheless, the Court considered that the fact that the affected consumers were informed of this right only through the official journal of the Member State but not personally by the relevant court (435) created a significant risk that the time-limit would expire without the consumers' being able to exercise their rights, which infringed the effectiveness principle and thereby the UCTD (436). The Court has referred to a two-week time-limit to object to a payment order based on a promissory note as a ‘brief period’ (437). It considered this period to be particularly problematic where the defendant has to organise his defence within these two weeks by submitting all his complaints and adducing facts and evidence. The Court (438) also considered that a period of 15 days combined with the requirement to give reasons for an objection against a payment order may dissuade a consumer from using this remedy.
Source: EUR-Lex (Cellar) · retrieved 2026-09-25 · Text as adopted (Official Journal); later amendments are not incorporated in this text.